Unofficial Synopsis of Goodridge et al v. the Department of Health
Prepared by the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court
The Supreme Judicial Court held today that "barring an individual
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex
violates the Massachusetts Constitution." The court stayed
the entry of judgment for 180 days "to permit the Legislature
to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this
opinion."
"Marriage is a vital social institution," wrote Chief
Justice Margaret H. Marshall for the majority of the Justices. "The
exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love
and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For those
who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage provides an
abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits. In turn it imposes
weighty legal, financial, and social obligations." The question
before the court was "whether, consistent with the Massachusetts
Constitution," the Commonwealth could deny those protections,
benefits, and obligations to two individuals of the same sex who
wish to marry.
In ruling that the Commonwealth could not do so, the court observed
that the Massachusetts Constitution "affirms the dignity and
equality of all individuals," and "forbids the creation
of second-class citizens." It reaches its conclusion, the court
said, giving "full deference to the arguments made by the Commonwealth."
The Commonwealth, the court ruled, "has failed to identify
any constitutionality adequate reason for denying civil marriage
to same-sex couples."
The court affirmed that it owes "great deference to the Legislature
to decide social and policy issues." Where, as here, the constitutionality
of a law is challenged, it is the "traditional and settled
role" of courts to decide the constitutional question. The
"marriage ban" the court held, "works a deep and
scarring hardship" on same-sex families "for no rational
reason." It prevents children of same-sex couples "from
enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance
of 'a stable family structure in which children will be reared,
educated, and socialized."' "It cannot be rational under
our laws," the court held, "to penalize children by depriving
them of State benefits" because of their parents' sexual orientation.
The court rejected the Commonwealth's claim that the primary purpose
of marriage was procreation. Rather, the history of the marriage
laws in the Commonwealth demonstrates that "it is the exclusive
and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another,
not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of marriage."
The court remarked that its decision "does not disturb the
fundamental value of marriage in our society." "That same-sex
couples are willing to embrace marriage's solemn obligations of
exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a
testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the
human spirit," the court stated.
The opinion reformulates the common-law definition of civil marriage
to mean "the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to
the exclusion of all others. Nothing that "civil marriage has
long been termed a 'civil right,"' the court concluded that
"the right to marry means little if it does not include the
right to marry the person of one's choice, subject to appropriate
government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety,
and welfare."
Justices John M. Greaney, Roderick L. Ireland, and Judity A. Cowin
joined in the court's opinion. Justice Greaney also filed a separate
concurring opinion.
Justices Francis X. Spina, Martha B. Sosman, and Robert J. Cordy
each filed separate dissenting opinions.
Justice Greaney concurred "with the result reached by the
court, the remedy ordered, and much of the reasoning in the court's
opinion," but expressed the view that "the case is more
directly resolved using traditional equal protection analysis."
He stated that to withhold "relief from the plaintiffs, who
wish to marry, and are otherwise eligible to marry, on the ground
that the couples are of the same gender, constitutes a categorical
restriction of a fundamental right." Moreover, Justice Greaney
concluded that such a restriction is impermissible under art. 1
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In so doing, Justice
Greaney did not rely on art. 1, as amended in 1976, because the
voters' intent in passing the amendment was clearly not to approve
gay marriage, but he relied on well-established principles of equal
protection that antedated the amendment.
Justice Cordy, with whom Justice Spina and Justice Sosman joined,
dissented on the ground that the marriage statute, as historically
interpreted to mean the union of one man and one woman, does not
violate the Massachusetts Constitution because "the Legislature
could rationally conclude that it furthers the legitimate State
purpose of ensuring, promoting, and supporting an optimal social
structure for the bearing and raising of children." Justice
Cordy stated that the court's conclusions to the contrary are unsupportable
in light of "the presumption of constitutional validity and
significant deference afforded to legislative enactments, and the
'undesirability of the judiciary substituting its notion of correct
policy for that of a popularly elected legislature' responsible
for making it.' Further, Justice Cordy stated that "[w]hile
'the Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty
against government intrusion at least as zealously and often more
so than does the Federal Constitution,' this case is not about government
intrusions into matters of personal liberty," but "about
whether the State must endorse and support [the choices of same-sex
couples] by changing the institution of civil marriage to make its
benefits, obligations, and responsibilities applicable to them."
Justice Cordy concluded that, although the plaintiffs had made a
powerful case for the extension of the benefits and burdens of civil
marriage to same-sex couples, the issue "is one deeply rooted
in social policy" and 'that decision must be made by the Legislature,
not the court."
Justice Spina, in a separately filed dissenting opinion, stated
that "[W]hat is at stake in this case is not the unequal treatment
of individuals or whether individuals rights have been impermissibly
burdened, but the power of the Legislature to effectuate social
change without interference from the courts, pursuant to art. 30
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights." He emphasized
that the "power to regulate marriage lies with the Legislature,
not with the judiciary."
Justice Sosman, in a separately filed dissenting opinion, stated
that "the issue is not whether the Legislature's rationale
behind [the statutory scheme being challenged] is persuasive to
[the court]," but whether it is "rational" for the
Legislature to "reserve judgment" on whether changing
the definition of marriage "can be made at this time without
damaging the institution of marriage or adversely affecting the
critical role it has played in our society." She concluded
that, "[a]bsent consensus on the issue (which obviously does
not exist), or unanimity amongst scientists studying the issue (which
also does not exist), or a more prolonged period of observation
of this new family structure (which has not yet been possible),
it is rational for the Legislature to postpone any redefinition
of marriage that would include same-sex couples until such time
as it is certain that redefinition will not have unintended and
undesirable social consequences."
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